Developing guidelines for school closure interventions to be used during a future influenza pandemic by Halder, Nilimesh et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Developing guidelines for school closure
interventions to be used during a future
influenza pandemic
Nilimesh Halder, Joel K Kelso, George J Milne
*
Abstract
Background: The A/H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic revealed that operational issues of school closure
interventions, such as when school closure should be initiated (activation trigger), how long schools should be
closed (duration) and what type of school closure should be adopted, varied greatly between and within countries.
Computer simulation can be used to examine school closure intervention strategies in order to inform public
health authorities as they refine school closure guidelines in light of experience with the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic.
Methods: An individual-based simulation model was used to investigate the effectiveness of school closure
interventions for influenza pandemics with R0 of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. The effectiveness of individual school closure and
simultaneous school closure were analyzed for 2, 4 and 8 weeks closure duration, with a daily diagnosed case based
intervention activation trigger scheme. The effectiveness of combining antiviral drug treatment and household
prophyaxis with school closure was also investigated.
Results: Illness attack rate was reduced from 33% to 19% (14% reduction in overall attack rate) by 8 weeks school
closure activating at 30 daily diagnosed cases in the community for an influenza pandemic with R0 = 1.5; when
combined with antivirals a 19% (from 33% to 14%) reduction in attack rate was obtained. For R0 >= 2.0, school
closure would be less effective. An 8 weeks school closure strategy gives 9% (from 50% to 41%) and 4% (from 59%
to 55%) reduction in attack rate for R0 = 2.0 and 2.5 respectively; however, school closure plus antivirals would give
a significant reduction (~15%) in over all attack rate. The results also suggest that an individual school closure
strategy would be more effective than simultaneous school closure.
Conclusions: Our results indicate that the particular school closure strategy to be adopted depends both on the
disease severity, which will determine the duration of school closure deemed acceptable, and its transmissibility. For
epidemics with a low transmissibility (R0 < 2.0) and/or mild severity, individual school closures should begin once a
daily community case count is exceeded. For a severe, highly transmissible epidemic (R0 >= 2.0), long duration
school closure should begin as soon as possible and be combined with other interventions.
Background
There is a continuing threat of a future novel influenza
pandemic having high morbidity (in terms of hospitali-
zation) and mortality (in terms of case fatality) rates.
Major pandemics occurred in the past century due to
antigenic shift and reassortment of influenza viruses
causing millions of deaths; among them 1918’s caused
the most death [1]. There were also influenza pandemics
that were moderate in terms of mortality in 1957 and
1968 [2]. In 2009, influenza A/H1N1 virus, first identi-
fied in Mexico, rapidly circulated around the world
causing an influenza pandemic [3]. The A/H1N1 2009
influenza pandemic has caused at least 16,455 deaths in
213 countries as of 28
th February, 2010 [4]. The 2009
influenza pandemic may cause public health authorities
to review their pandemic mitigation guidelines in the
light of the limited success in containing and controlling
the pandemic. Therefore, improved pandemic guidelines
are especially required for future highly pathogenic * Correspondence: milne@csse.uwa.edu.au
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H5N1 virus emerges.
The influenza pandemic guidelines of many countries
[5-7] and the World Health Organization (WHO) [8]
suggest a series of non-pharmaceutical and pharmaceu-
tical interventions. Among those intervention strategies,
school closure is commonly suggested as a key interven-
tion strategy to slow down the spread of a pandemic
within a community, particularly at the early stages of
its advancement. The rationale for considering school
closures as a frontline intervention is that children and
young adults are thought to be the most susceptible to
any influenza virus due to their high contact rates
within school clusters and limited (or no) immunity to a
circulating virus strain when compared to adults. The
significance of school closure is also reflected in the A/
H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic where about a 60% of
cases infected with influenza A/H1N1 virus are 18 years
old or younger [9], and many of the disease transmis-
sions took place in school clusters [9-12]. In addition,
school closure can be quickly adopted with a high
degree of compliance. School closure strategies are
therefore significant for controlling the spread of a pan-
demic within a community, by breaking the chain of
disease transmission among school children and young
adults. This frontline intervention is also intended to
allow sufficient time for the distribution of antiviral
drugs and development of new vaccines.
During the early progression phase of the A/H1N1
2009 influenza pandemic, school closure interventions
and application of antiviral drugs for treatment and pro-
phylaxis were implemented in Australia and other parts
of the world [13-15]; however, in certain countries the
activation of these measures appears to have been some-
what haphazard. Modelling studies [16-22,10,23] have
shown that influenza virus strains which are more trans-
missible than A/H1N1 2009 influenza pandemic, would
be susceptible to attack rate reduction through school
closure strategies, and might be contained if combined
with other social distancing and pharmaceutical inter-
ventions. Benefits, in terms of reduced attack rates
(cumulative illness attack rate and daily incidence rate)
and avoided hospitalizations and deaths, would be
expected from closing schools during an influenza pan-
demic; however, school closure must be weighed against
the potential high economic and social costs. Studies
[9,24] suggested that a 12 weeks school closure might
cost in range of 0.2% - 1.0% of GDP in the UK. Strong
hesitance may be experienced in the implementing
school closure unless the virus strain is severe, i.e. has a
high case fatality ratio. In addition there is no clear
agreement on operational issues such as, when school
closure should be initiated (its activation trigger), how
long schools should be closed (length of closure or
duration) and what types of school closures (either
individual school closure or simultaneous school closure)
should be adopted. In this context, Cauchemez et al.
reviewed historical approaches of school closure strate-
gies as a public health policy in [9]. No modelling study
has yet extensively and systematically evaluated the
operational issues of school closure interventions in
terms of how they impact on the effectiveness of alter-
native school closure strategies; the objective of this
study is to do just this. In light of the varied school clo-
sure responses [11,14,15] to the A/H1N1 2009 influenza
pandemic taken by many countries we believe that the
outcomes from this detailed evaluation of school closure
strategies will help better inform public health policy
makers as to the optimal use of school closure measures
during a future influenza pandemic.
Methods
Population model
A detailed simulation model of a real community of
Albany (a small city in Western Australia) with ~
30,000 population was used to simulate local epidemics
for R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 with the dynamics of
influenza A/H1N1 2009 swine flu virus. Details and an
extensive methodological description of the population
model used here was described in [21,23,25]. Using this
model, we conducted stochastic, individual-based simu-
lations of local epidemics, assuming that an average of
one new infection per day was randomly introduced
into the population for the whole epidemic. The simula-
tion period was divided into 12 hour day/night cycles
and during each simulation cycle a nominal location of
each individual was calculated, taking into consideration
the cycle type (day/night, weekday/weekend), the infec-
tion state of each individual and whether child supervi-
sion was needed to look after a child at home.
Individuals residing in the same location during the
same period of time (cycle) were assumed to come into
potential infective contact.
School Closure and Antiviral interventions
The school closure interventions modelled were
individual school closure and simultaneous school closure
strategies. In the individual school closure strategy, we
assumed that upon a single diagnosed symptomatic case
within a primary school, the whole school was closed; if
there was one or two cases diagnosed in a high school
only the class members of the affected class were iso-
lated; and finally if there were more than two cases diag-
nosed in a high school the entire school was closed.
However, this school closure policy was only activated
when the daily number of diagnosed cases in the com-
munity reached an activation trigger. Cases occurring in
schools before this time did not result in school closure.
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where all schools in the community were closed simul-
taneously, using a similar community activation trigger.
School closure interventions were modelled for fixed
durations from 2, 4 or 8 weeks. The intervention activa-
tion trigger was modelled in a way such that the inter-
vention would come into effect when there was a
certain reported number of diagnosed cases per day in
the community (for example, after reported cases
reached 20 per day the public health authority may
announce 2 weeks of school closure).
We also evaluated the application of antiviral drugs to
allow us to examine intervention strategies which com-
bine school closure with antiviral treatment and prophy-
laxis, as occurred during the A/H1N1 2009 influenza
pandemic [13]. We assume that 50% of symptomatic
individuals were diagnosed and treated with antiviral
drugs and their close contact household members were
given antivirals for prophylaxis. We also assumed that
the antivirals were distributed continually throughout
the pandemic period, restricted to 1 course for treat-
ment and maximum 2 courses for prophylaxis per indi-
vidual. The antiviral administration strategy began once
the reported cases in the community reached 10 per
day. This would provide sufficient time to the public
health authorities to become aware of the arrival of the
epidemic in the community and allow time for antiviral
distribution and so forth. Detailed modelling explanation
and parameters for antiviral drug interventions are given
in [26] with key details being repeated below.
Transmission Model
The transmission probability that a susceptible indivi-
dual would be infected by an infectious individual when
the two came into contact was calculated according to
the following transmission function, which takes into
account the disease infectivity of the infectious indivi-
dual Ii and the susceptibility of susceptible individual Is
at the time of contact. The transmission probability
function is given as follows:
PI n f S u s c A V F trans i s i s i s II I I II (, ) () ( ) (, ) =× × ×  
The baseline transmission coefficient b was initially
chosen to give an epidemic with an attack rate of 17.4%
which is consistent with seasonal influenza. To achieve
simulations under a range of reproductive numbers,
b was increase from this baseline value to achieve epi-
demics of various R0 magnitudes. Details of the proce-
dure for estimating R0 calibrating b are given in [21].
The disease infectivity parameter Inf(Ii) was set to 1
for symptomatic individuals at the peak period of infec-
tion and then to 0.5 for the rest of the infectivity period.
The infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals was also
a s s u m e dt ob e0 . 5a n dt h i sa p p l i e dt oa l li n f e c t e d
individuals after the latent period but before onset of
symptoms. The infection profile of a symptomatic indi-
v i d u a lw a sa s s u m e dt ol a s tf o r6d a y sa sf o l l o w s :a
0.5 day latent period (with Inf(Ii) set to 0) is followed
by 1 day asymptomatic and infectious, where Inf(Ii) is
set to 0.5; then 2 days at peak infectiousness (with Inf
(Ii) set to 1.0); followed by 2.5 days reduced infectious-
ness (with Inf(Ii) set to 0.5). For an infected but asymp-
tomatic individual the whole infectious period (of
5.5 days) is at the reduced level of infectiousness with
Inf(Ii) set to 0.5. This infectivity profile is a simplifica-
tion of the infectivity distribution found in a study of
viral shedding [27]. Following infection an individual is
assumed to be immune to re-infection for the duration
of the simulation. We further assume that influenza
symptoms develop one day into the infectious period
[27], with 20% of infections being asymptomatic among
children and 32% being asymptomatic among adults.
These percentages were derived by summing the age-
specific antibody titres determined in table five of [28].
Symptomatic individuals withdrew into the home with
the following probabilities; adults 50% and children 90%,
which is in keeping with the work of [16,17].
The susceptibility parameter Susc(Is) is a function
directly dependent on the age of the susceptible indivi-
dual. It captures age-varying susceptibility to transmis-
sion due to either partial prior immunity or age-related
differences in contact behavior. To achieve a realistic
age specific infection rate, the age-specific susceptibility
parameters were calibrated against the serologic infec-
tion rates for seasonal H3N2 in 1977-1978 in Tecumseh,
Michigan [29].
The antiviral efficacy factor AVF(Ii, Is)=( 1-A V E i)*
(1 - AVEs) represents the potential reduction in infec-
tiousness of an infected individual (denoted by AVEi)
induced by antiviral treatment, and the reduction in sus-
ceptibility of a susceptible individual (denoted by AVEs)
induced by antiviral prophylaxis. When no antiviral inter-
vention was administrated the values of both AVEi and
AVEs w e r ea s s u m e dt ob e0 ,i n d i c a t i n gn or e d u c t i o ni n
infectiousness or susceptibility. However, when antiviral
treatment was being applied to the infectious individual
the value of AVEi was set at 0.66, capturing a reduction
in infectiousness by factor of 66% [30]. Similarly, when
the susceptible individual was undergoing antiviral pro-
phylaxis the value of AVEs was set to 0.85 indicating a
reduction in susceptibility by a factor of 85% [30].
Results
Simulated characteristics of the epidemics under the
un-mitigated scenarios
Three separate influenza epidemics with the basic repro-
ductive number, R0 of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 were simulated
using the Albany population model. The outcomes of
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random location of infectious individuals seeded into
the model as index cases and the probabilistic model of
influenza transmission. We further assumed that a con-
tinuous influx of infectious individuals was introduced
from outside of the simulation boundary at a rate of
one infectious case per day to achieve a sustained epi-
demic for each simulation. Therefore we determined the
results of all simulated epidemics from the average of 40
separate simulation runs, each with stochastic choices
made using a different random number sequence. The
mean cumulative illness attack rates (or attack rate) of
40 simulation runs were 33% (standard deviation 0.57%),
50% and 59% of the total simulated population corre-
sponding to R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 respectively;
while peak daily incidences were 120, 333 and 564 cases
per 10,000 population. The mean serial intervals or gen-
eration times are 2.49 days, 2.36 days and 2.21 days cor-
responding to R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 respectively.
Impact of duration on school closure interventions
The impact which different school closure durations
have in reducing attack rate depends on the transmissi-
bility of the particular virus strain, activation trigger and
the type of school closure. The reduction in attack rate
due to 2, 4 and 8 weeks school closure strategies for R0
of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 is shown in Figure 1.
For R0 = 1.5 a maximum of 8% (from 33% to 25%),
10% (from 33% to 23%) and 14% (from 33% to 19%)
reduction in attack rate can be achieved at 2, 4 and 8
weeks of school closure respectively (see Figure 1 for R0
= 1.5; blue, orange and dark red lines with circle and
square marker).
For R0 = 2.0, a maximum of a 5% (from 50% to 45%),
a 7% (from 50% to 43%) and a 9% (from 50% to 41%)
reduction in attack rate achieved for 2 weeks, 4 weeks
and 8 weeks of school closure respectively (see Figure 1
for R0 = 2.0; blue, orange and dark red lines with circle
and square marker).
Similarly for R0 = 2.5, a maximum of a 3% (from 59%
to 56%), a 4% (from 59% to 55%) and 5% (from 59% to
54%) reduction in attack rate obtained for 2 weeks, 4
weeks and 8 weeks of school closure respectively (see
Figure 1 for R0 = 2.5; blue, orange and dark red lines
with circle and square marker).
Combining antiviral treatment and household prophy-
laxis (T+H) with school closure strategies decreases the
attack rates for all duration scenarios. For example, for
R0 = 2.0 and 2.5, ~10% reduction in attack rate would
be achieved by coupling T+H with the school closure
strategies compared to the purely school closure strate-
gies (see Figure 1 for R0 = 2.0 and 2.5; comparing the
results with T+H (diamond and triangle marker) and
without T+H (circle and square marker) for all blue,
orange and dark red lines); whereas for R0 =1 . 5 ,~ 8 % ,
~7% and ~5% reductions in attack rate would be
achieved by 2, 4 and 8 weeks school closure strategies
respectively (see Figure 1 for R0 = 1.5).
The effectiveness of school closure on the reduction in
the peak daily incidence i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2f o rt h e
range of R0’s, activation triggers and durations consid-
ered. The pattern of reduction in the peak daily inci-
dence is similar to that of the cumulative illness attack
rate, although the reduction is larger in relative terms.
The most notable difference is that the consequences of
premature school closures are greater for the peak daily
incidence, especially for R0 >= 2.0 (see Figure 2, blue
lines with circle maker, centre and right panels).
Our simulation results show that for R0 = 1.5, a maxi-
mum reduction of 64 (from 120 to 56), 80 (from 120 to
40), 87 (from 120 to 33) cases per 10,000 population
would be achieved by 2, 4 and 8 weeks school closure
respectively. For R0 = 2.5, a maximum reduction of 184
(from 564 to 380), 194 (from 564 to 370), 214 (from
564 to 350) cases would be achieved by 2, 4 and
8 weeks school closure respectively (see Figure 2; dark
blue, orange and dark red lines with circle and square
marker).
Coupling antiviral treatment and household prophy-
laxis (T+H) with school closure strategies would further
reduce the peak daily incidence. For example, at R0 =
2.5, a maximum reduction of 304 (from 564 to 260)
cases per 10,000 would be achieved by 2 weeks school
closure strategies with an activation trigger of 30 daily
diagnosed cases (see Figure 2; dark blue lines with
diamond and triangle marker).
Impact of activation trigger on school closure
interventions
The reductions in attack rate achievable by school
closure reported above depend on schools closing at the
right time. One of the observable measures of the
advance of an influenza epidemic used in public heath
forecasting is the number newly infected cases per day,
as estimated by the reported number of daily diagnosed
cases. In our simulation results, the reported number of
daily diagnosed cases has been used as an activation
trigger used to initiate the school closure interventions.
Our study indicates that the activation trigger which
gives the maximum reduction in attack rate depends on
R0, the closure duration, and the type of school closure
intervention in a non-trivial way. The impact of the acti-
vation trigger on the reduction of attack rate is shown
in Figure 1.
If schools close for 2 weeks an activation trigger of at
least 50 cases per day gives an 8% (from 33% to 25%)
reduction in attack for R0 = 1.5 (see Figure 1 for R0 =
1.5; blue lines with circle and square marker); whereas
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demics with R0 >= 2.0, (see Figure 1 for R0 >= 2.0; blue
lines with circle and square marker).
For 4 weeks of school closure, activation triggers of 40,
50 and 10 cases per day should be used to obtain optimal
attack rates (see Figure 1; orange lines with circle and
square marker) for R0 of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 respectively.
With 8 weeks of school closure, activation triggers of 30,
5 and 1 case(s) per day give the maximum reduction in
attack rate for R0’s of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 respectively (see
Figure 1; dark red lines with circle and square marker).
When adding antiviral treatment and household pro-
phylaxis (T+H) to school closure strategies, simulation
suggests that school closure activation triggers of 20,
40 and 50 cases per day are within 1% of optimal for
R0 of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 respectively (see Figure 1; lines
with diamond and triangle marker) and these activa-
tion triggers apply for all durations from 2 to 8 weeks.
When antivirals are added to school closure, there is
less variation in attack rate due to variation in the
school closure activation trigger. This is because when
antivirals are used, most (at least half, for the
Figure 1 Final illness attack rate of epidemics with school closure operational issues. Outcomes of two different types of school closure
intervention strategies (individual school closure and simultaneous school closure) for 2, 4 and 8 weeks school closure duration with/without
antiviral treatment plus household prophylaxis (T+H) for three different R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 as a function of a number of daily diagnosed
cases (activation trigger) are shown. The outcomes are reported in cumulative illness attack rate as a percentage of the simulated population
size. The non-intervention or baseline epidemics are shown in green line. Three different colours have been used to report school closure
periods; dark blue for 2 weeks, orange for 4 weeks and dark red for 8 weeks closure duration, using four different markers used to distinbuish
the two types of school closure intervention and presence/absence of antiviral treatment plus household prophylaxis. We assumed that 50% of
symptomatic cases would be diagnosed after 1 day of their symptom’s appearance. We further assumed that antiviral treatment and prophylaxis
(T+H) began after 10 cases were diagnosed in one day in the community.
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due to antivirals, which have the same effect regard-
less of the school closure activation trigger. As a
result, achieving optimal reduction in attack rates for
the combined strategies is less dependant on precise
choice of the activation trigger. It turns out that this
is true to such a degree that for each R0 as i n g l ea c t i -
vation trigger can be chosen for all school closure
durations that gives a final attack rate that is within
1% of the best possible outcome. The concurrent use
of this antiviral strategy thus effectively eliminates the
dependency of optimal activation trigger on school
closure duration.
We have summarized the relationship between activa-
tion trigger (as the reported number of daily diagnosed
cases), the proportion of population infected per day,
the proportion of population infected within the com-
munity and the timing delay between the first infected
individual appearing in the population, and the time at
which interventions are initiated. The summarized
results are given in Table 1.
Impact of individual school vs. simultaneous school
closure interventions
T h et y p eo fs c h o o lc l o s u r e( e i t h e rindividual school
closure or simultaneous school closure)w h i c hg i v e st h e
maximum reduction in attack rate also depends on R0,
activation triggers and closure durations. The compara-
tive effectiveness of both individual school closure and
simultaneous school closure interventions are given in
Table 2. Our simulation results suggest that simultaneous
school closure is more effective if it is perfectly timed.
However, the range of timings (activation triggers) that
give the optimal reduction in attack rate can be narrow.
Individual school closure is often capable of achieving
almost the same reduction in attack rate, but over
Figure 2 Peak daily incidence rate of epidemics with school closure operational issues. Outcomes of two different types of school closure
intervention strategies (individual school closure and simultaneous school closure) for 2, 4 and 8 weeks school closure duration with/without
antiviral treatment plus household prophylaxis (T+H) for three different R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 as a function of a number of daily diagnosed
cases (activation trigger) are shown. The outcomes are reported in peak daily incidence rate per 10,000 of the population size, and assume a
diagnosis ratio of 50%.
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R0
Activation trigger 1.5 2.0 2.5
Cases
diagnosed
per day
% of population
diagnosed per day
Cumulative
diagnosed cases
(%)
Activation
delay in days
Cumulative
diagnosed cases
(%)
Activation
delay in days
Cumulative
diagnosed cases
(%)
Activation
delay in days
1 0.003 1 (0.003) 5 1 (0.003) 5 1 (0.003) 5
5 0.017 19 (0.063) 14 14 (0.047) 11 12 (0.04) 9
10 0.033 53 (0.177) 20 40 (0.133) 14 31 (0.104) 11.5
15 0.05 97 (0.33) 24 60 (0.2) 16 48 (0.16) 13
20 0.067 136 (0.45) 26 83 (0.277) 17 68 (0.227) 14
25 0.083 190 (0.63) 28 109 (0.364) 18 85 (0.284) 14.5
30 0.1 237 (0.79) 30 136 (0.454) 19 99 (0.33) 15
40 0.13 335 (1.12) 33 188 (0.627) 20 140 (0.467) 15.5
50 0.167 454 (1.52) 36 235 (0.784) 21 179 (0.597) 16
60 0.2 586 (2.0) 38 288 (0.96) 21.5 214 (0.714) 16.5
70 0.233 708 (2.4) 40 345 (1.15) 22 245 (0.817) 17
80 0.267 848 (2.83) 42 409 (1.364) 23 298 (0.994) 17.5
90 0.3 958 (3.2) 43 447 (1.49) 23.5 342 (1.14) 18
100 0.333 1107 (3.7) 45 528 (1.76) 24 366 (1.22) 18.5
The table shows a range of daily diagnosed case(s) in the community, which our simulations use as school closure activation triggers. It relates the activation
trigger to the proportion of population newly diagnosed per day, the cumulative number of diagnosed cases, and the consequent delay in intervention
corresponding to each activation trigger, for three different simulated epidemics with R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5.
For a number of daily diagnosed cases to count towards the intervention activation, it is assumed that the following sequence of events occurs:
i) The individual becomes infected with the pandemic strain.
ii) The individual experiences significant symptoms.
iii) They seek medical attention.
iv) The infection is identified as pandemic influenza strain.
v) The case should is reported to a public health monitoring scheme.
The diagnosis ratio (or ascertainment efficiency) is assumed such that 50% of the symptomatic cases should be diagnosed following the conditional probability
that event e) occurs given that both a) and b) have occurred. A further assumption is that there are no false positive reports during pandemic influenza.
Table 2 Optimal attack rate reductions and sensitivity to activation trigger for school closure strategies
School closure duration
2 weeks 4 weeks 8 weeks
R0 Intervention Attack rate Activation trigger range Attack rate Activation trigger range Attack rate Activation trigger range
1.5 none 32.5 32.5 32.5
ISC 25.0 30 - 70 22.7 20 - 50 19.0 10 - 30
SSC 24.7 60 - 80 22.4 40 - 60 18.3 20 - 30
ISC + AV 17.3 1-3 0 16.0 1-30 14.0 1-20
SSC + AV 17.0 30 - 40 15.9 20-30 13.8 20-30
2.0 none 49.9 49.9 49.9
ISC 45.0 40 - 90 43.0 10 - 70 41.0 1 - 10
SSC 45.2 70 - 90 42.8 30 - 90 40.5 10 - 30
ISC + AV 35.5 1- 80 33.6 20 - 90 31.6 1 - 10
SSC + AV 35.3 70 - 90 33.4 50 - 90 31.5 10 - 50
2.5 none 58.8 58.8 58.8
ISC 55.8 30 - 90 54.8 1 - 20 54.5 1-5 0
SSC 55.7 80 - 90 54.7 10 - 90 54.2 1-5 0
ISC + AV 46.7 30 - 90 45.5 1-9 0 44.8 1 - 10
SSC + AV 46.7 60 - 90 45.5 20 - 90 44.3 1-3 0
For each R0 value in, each school closure intervention (individual vs. simultaneous, with and without antiviral treatment and household prophylaxis), and eachs c h o o l
closure duration (of 2, 4 or 8 weeks), this table gives: (a) the reduced attack rate attained by closing schools with the optimal time (i.e. using the optimal activation
trigger), and (b) the range of activation triggers for which the attack rate reduction is almost the same as the optimal value. Attack rate is expressed in % of population.
The range of school closure activation trigger as a reported number of daily diagnosed cases. The bold activation trigger indicates the wider range of a school closure
strategy for which that strategy would be more effective i.e. the attack rate would be almost same. A diagnosis ratio of 50% is assumed.
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R0 =1 . 5 ,a n~ 8 %( f r o m3 3 %t o2 5 % )r e d u c t i o ni na t t a c k
rate would be achieved by 2 weeks simultaneous school
closure when the number of daily diagnosed cases (activa-
tion trigger) reached 70, with almost the same effect
being obtained within the range of 60 and 80 diagnosed
cases per day (see Figure 1 for R0 = 1.5; blue lines with
circle marker). However, the same ~8% reduction would
be achieved by 2 weeks individual school closure when
the number of daily diagnosed cases (activation trigger)
reached 50, with almost the same effect being obtained
within the wider range of 30 and 70 diagnosed cases per
day (see Figure 1 for R0 = 1.5; blue lines with square mar-
ker). A detailed summary of the range of activation trig-
gers for each school closure strategy, at which a
maximum reduction in attack rate can be achieved, is
given in Table 2.
School closure and age-specific attack rates
Although our simulated school closures applied
directly to the 6-12 and 13-17 age groups, we found
that reductions in attack rate were experienced by all
age groups. Figure 3 shows age-specific attack rates for
an epidemic with R0 of 1.5, for the baseline (no-inter-
vention) case and for 2 and 8 weeks of school closure.
Although proportional reductions in attack rates are
largest in the school age groups (37% and 39% for the
6-12 and 13-17 groups respectively for 8 weeks school
closure), the reductions in the other age groups are
still considerable, ranging from 28% to 33% for 8
weeks school closure. As the school-age groups com-
p r i s eo n l y2 0 %o ft h ep o p u l a t i o n ,t h er e s u l t si n d i c a t e
that 66% of cases avoided due to school closure occur
outside the school age groups.
Sensitivity analysis
Epidemiological data for pandemic influenza are often
uncertain, sparse, limited and widely distributed. There
are uncertainties in characteristics such as mortality,
morbidity, disease transmissibility, contact behavior and
behavioral changes among people during a pandemic
and also in antiviral and vaccine efficacies, pre-existing
immunities and well as other uncertainties. The simula-
tion model upon which the current study is based has
been subject to an analysis determining its sensitivity to
alternative estimates for parameters relating to serial
interval, age-specific attack rates and other assumptions
(see [21], electronic supplementary material, Text S2).
This analysis shows sensitivity of the un-mitigated attack
rate and of the attack rate when mitigated by school clo-
sure. The current simulation model differs from the ear-
lier model only in that it has a more refined model of
viral shedding (see Methods, Transmission model).
In this study we tested the sensitivity of our results to
the parameter known as diagnosis ratio (or case ascer-
tainment efficiency) ranging from 10% to 100% of symp-
tomatic cases being diagnosed during the epidemic
period. The diagnosis ratio may be influenced by an effi-
cient surveillance policy and has a significant impact on
the effectiveness of interventions. The outcomes for dif-
ferent levels of diagnosis ratio for school closure strate-
gies for an epidemic with a reproduction number R0 =
1 . 5a r eg i v e ni nF i g u r e4 .I nt h i sf i g u r e ,o p t i m a la c t i v a -
tion triggers are used assuming a diagnosis ratio of 50%,
but the true diagnosis ratio is allowed to vary.
The most notable outcome is that at least a 40% diag-
nosis ratio is required for the maximum reduction in
attack rate (see Figure 4; green and purple line). A
lower diagnosis ratio would result in an excessive delay
of school closure activation. In contrast, underestimating
the diagnosis ratio (and consequently introducing school
closure too soon) has less serious consequences. The
relationship between activation trigger and activation
delay, assuming a diagnosis ratio of 50%, is given in
Table 1.
Discussion
Key findings
This modelling work indicates that school closure stra-
tegies most effectively reduce both attack rate and peak
daily incidence if they are initiated at the correct time -
in this study, when a given number of cases have been
diagnosed per day (see Table 3). A limited reduction in
attack rate is obtained if closure activation occurs imme-
diately (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). This phenomenon
arises when school closure is triggered too early (at a
single community-wide diagnosed case) and the school
c l o s u r es t r a t e g yi sa p p l i e do n l yo n c ea n df o raf i x e d ,
limited closure duration, and is clearly illustrated in
Figure 3 Impact of school closure on age-specific attack rates.
Age specific attack rates (the proportion of each age group
experiencing symptomatic infection) are shown for the baseline
case (no interventions), 2 weeks school closure and 8 weeks school
closure. The unmitigated epidemic has an R0 of 1.5. School closure
is timed optimally according to policy recommendation in Table 4.
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Page 8 of 14Figure 5 which shows epidemic curves for various
school closure durations and activation triggers.
For example, for an epidemic with an R0 of 1.5, with a
4 weeks school closure strategy (either individual school
closure or simultaneous school closure) triggered by a
single diagnosed case, the simulation results indicate
that school closure slows the initial epidemic growth,
but when school closure interventions are relaxed after
4 weeks the epidemic restarts (see Figure 5 for R0 =1 . 5 ;
blue and light green lines). Therefore, determining the
optimal school closure trigger is crucial when the num-
ber of times schools close and their duration is limited.
The optimal school closure activation triggers for a
range of reproduction numbers, school closure types
and duration scenarios are given in Table 3.
A greater number of activation triggers (for the repro-
duction numbers and durations considered) have the
individual school closure strategy performing better (in
terms of reduction in attack rate) than that involving
simultaneous school closure. For the trigger scenarios
where simultaneous closure is the better strategy, diffi-
culty arises if the optimal case load trigger is missed,
possibly due to under- or mis-diagnosis of cases. If this
is the situation then individual school closure performs
better, and hence is a safer strategy to adopt.
Given that at the beginning of an influenza pandemic
we are unlikely to know how many asymptomatic or
un-diagnosed cases exist, it may be difficult to deter-
mine when the optimal activation trigger has been
reached. Since individual school closure does almost as
Figure 4 Impact of diagnosis ratio on the effectiveness of school closure activation trigger for R0 =1 . 5 . Outcomes of the activation
trigger that would give the maximum reduction in attack rate (as Optimal trigger given in Table 3 assuming 50% diagnosis ratio) and the
activation trigger at a single symptomatic case (Single case trigger) for individual school closure (ISC) and simultaneous school closure (SSC)
strategies in relation to diagnosis ratio (% of symptomatic cases) are shown. The outcomes are reported in percentage of the simulated
population size for the epidemics with R0 values of 1.5 regarding school closure durations of 2, 4 and 8 weeks.
Table 3 Optimal school closure activation triggers
Optimal triggers in the number of daily diagnosed cases per 30,000 population (% of population
newly infected per day)
R0
School closure strategy Duration 1.5 2.0 2.5
ISC 2 weeks 50 (0.16) 80 (0.26) 80 (0.26)
4 weeks 40 (0.13) 50 (0.16) 10 (0.03)
8 weeks 20 (0.06) 1 (0.003) 1 (0.003)
SSC 2 weeks 70 (0.23) 80 (0.26) 80 (0.26)
4 weeks 50 (0.16) 50 (0.16) 10 (0.03)
8 weeks 30 (0.1) 10 (0.03) 1 (0.003)
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Page 9 of 14well over a greater number of activation triggers, this
suggests that it is a more reliable strategy to adopt in
the face of uncertainty about the true degree of epi-
demic spread. Furthermore, individual school closure is
more likely to be socially acceptable for mild pandemic
strains, as parents will be aware of the local cases trig-
gering the school closures that affect them.
The marginal increase in effectiveness of additional
weeks of school closure decreases as the duration
increases. For example, at R0 = 1.5, 2 weeks school clo-
sure gives an 8% reduction (4% per week) in attack rate.
An additional 2 weeks school closure gives an additional
2% (1% per week) reduction. A further 4 weeks school
closure (8 weeks total) gives an additional 4% (1% per
week) reduction (see Figure 1 for R0 =1 . 5 ;b l u e ,o r a n g e
and dark red lines with circle and square marker).
School closure and antiviral drug use for treatment
and prophylaxis are complementary. The combination
of antiviral strategies together with school closure
always gives an increased reduction in attack rate com-
pared to either in isolation, across different transmissi-
bility characteristics, school closure activation triggers
(except for significantly delayed school closure at R0 =
1.5), school closure types and school closure durations
(see Figure 1 for R0 = 1.5).
Modelling features and relationship to other studies
We have developed an individual-based simulation
model of Albany (a small city of ~30,000 populations in
Western Australia) utilizing Australian Bureau of Statis-
tics Census data [31] to simulate virtual epidemics with
a range of characteristics and to systematically evaluate
Figure 5 Daily epidemic progression curves for different school closure activation triggers. The daily incidence curves of the simulated
epidemics (with R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5) with the activation trigger that would be given the maximum reduction in attack rate (as Optimal
trigger) and the activation trigger at a single symptomatic case (as Single case trigger) for individual school closure (ISC) and simultaneous school
closure (SSC) strategies for 2, 4 and 8 weeks duration are shown. The red epidemic curves are for the baseline or un-mitigated epidemics for
corresponding R0s. Blue and light green curves are for the prompt triggered ISC and SSC strategies. The other pink and dark green lines are for
the best triggered ISC and SSC strategies.
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Page 10 of 14school closure strategies. Related models ranged in scale
from the whole world [32], through large [17,18] and
smaller [16,33] countries, to actual [21] and synthetic
[19,10] small communities. Our model differs from the
differential equations-based deterministic and compart-
mental models [34-37] which consider homogeneous
mixing patterns within and between subpopulations; for
a survey on mathematical modelling of influenza pan-
demics see [38]. Our model encompasses significant
complexity including spatial contact structure; age
specific susceptibility; mixing groups and community
wide random contacts [21,23]. For the purposes of this
study the model has been augmented with sophisticated
models of school closure and antiviral prophylaxis and
treatment.
Empirical evidence and previous modelling studies
indicate that school closure can reduce the magnitude
of an influenza epidemic; for a review see [9]. The effec-
tiveness of school closure clearly depends on operational
issues such as what type of school closure is adopted
(simultaneous school closure or individual school
closure), when school closure should be triggered, and
how long schools should be closed.
Previous modelling studies have made particular
assumptions, plausible or idealized, about these issues,
and found school closure to be effective to a lesser or
greater extent. In Ferguson et al. [17] 3 weeks of indivi-
dual school closure strategy was chosen for multiple
times and the strategy was activated after a single com-
munity case was detected. In Germann et al. [18], Glass
et al. [19] and Davey et al. [20,39], simultaneous school
closure strategy was assumed for whole pandemic period
with an activation trigger following single or several
community case(s) detection (in Germann et al. trig-
gered at 1 community case, in Glass et al. at 10 commu-
nity case and in Davey et al. a sensitivity for 10, 30 and
100 community cases was shown). In Milne et al. [21] a
comparison of school closure interventions evaluated
using different individual-based models was studied. In
that study the authors emphasized the benefit of long
duration school closure in containing an influenza pan-
demic. However long term school closure has an
adverse economic impact; Sadique et al. [24] estimated
ac o s ti nt h er a n g e0 . 2 %-1 . 0 %o fG D Pi nt h eU Kf o l -
lowing a 12 weeks of school closure. The effectiveness
of school closure evaluated in these modelling studies
depended largely on the underlying assumptions made
about their models.
In this study we have explicitly considered three key
school closure operational issues which were identified
in [9] as being significant. These are when school
closure should be initiated (activation trigger), how long
schools should be closed (duration) and what type of
school closure should be adopted and determined their
impact on influenza pandemics: no previous modelling
study has systematically evaluated such school closure
operational issues. We believe that the detailed evalua-
tion of such strategies will contribute to further develop-
ment of school closure policy guidelines for future
influenza pandemics.
Antiviral drug strategies also play an important role in
controlling disease spread at the early stages of an out-
break. In addition to school closure (in isolation), we
simulated the application of antiviral drug treatment
and prophylaxis to household members of an infected
case layered with school closure. A detailed evaluation
of the effectiveness of antiviral drug strategies applied to
a pandemic similar to the A/H1N1 2009 influenza pan-
demic has been investigated in [26].
There are some limitations of the model used in this
study. As the model is based on a population in a devel-
oped country the outcomes may not be applicable to
populations in a developing country, where populations
may be less mobile and have higher population densi-
ties. We have focused on the reduction in the number
of daily symptomatic cases and the cumulative illness
attack rate as they are used for determining intervention
effectiveness rather than focusing on influenza-related
a d v e r s ee v e n t ss u c ha sh o s p i t a l i z a t i o n sa n dd e a t h s .W e
also do not take account of possible antiviral drug resis-
tance [40,41] that may arise due to the implementation
of antiviral drug strategies, as our main goal is to sug-
gest refinements to policy guidelines for school closure.
Public health policy implications
We have evaluated a range of school closure activation
triggers (as a function of the reported number of daily
diagnosed cases in a community), school closure dura-
tions, and types of school closure interventions for the
potential control of a future influenza pandemic. The
results may be used to inform public health authorities
as they revise guidelines for school closure. Although
short periods of school closure strategies were adopted
in different countries as an attempt at controlling spread
the A/H1N12009 influenza pandemic [11,14,15,42],
they met with limited success; for a highly pathogenic
influenza pandemic longer periods of school closure
w o u l dn e e dt ob ea d o p t e d( s e eT a b l e4 )a ss c h o o l
closure policy recommendations. Our results imply that
c l o s u r ep e r i o d sl o n g e rt h a n2w e e k sm a yb ee f f e c t i v ei n
giving significant reduction in attack rate (see Figure 1;
for R0 = 1.5).
We assume that a key factor which will determine the
duration of school closure will be the perceived severity
of the pandemic (i.e. morbidity and mortality given as
case hospitalization and case fatality ratios). For a ‘mild’
pandemic similar to the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic and
similar in severity to seasonal influenza [43], it is
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Page 11 of 14unlikely that school closure would be tolerated for peri-
ods longer than two weeks. In contrast, during a pan-
demic with severity similar to the 1918 pandemic (case
fatality ratio estimated as > 2.5%) [1], the public might
accept (or even demand) school closure for several
months.
Recommendations for school closure interventions
should reflect that in the case of a severe pandemic with
high transmissibility (R0 >= 2.0), where schools would
be closed for at least 8 weeks, all schools should be
closed at the same time, as early as possible once the
epidemic reaches the local community. In the case of a
moderately severe pandemic (case fatality ratio < 1.0%)
where schools would be closed for at least 4 weeks,
schools should close individually once cases are detected
in each school and this policy should be instituted as
soon as possible. In the case of a mild pandemic similar
to the A/H1N1 2009, where at most 2 weeks of school
closure would be adopted, schools should close indivi-
dually, but the policy should be delayed until the first
day on which 0.13% of the population becomes newly
infected (on that day), assuming 50% of symptomatic
cases would be diagnosed (see Table 4 for a set of possi-
ble school closure policy recommendations).
The additional use of antiviral treatment and prophy-
laxis will give a greater reduction in attack rate than
school closure in isolation for influenza epidemics with
R0 >= 2.0, (see Figure 1 for R0 >= 2.0).
For epidemics with R0 <= 1.5 where antivirals are
used, there is no advantage having periods longer than 2
weeks (eg. 4 or 8 weeks) of school closure if school clo-
sure is delayed for 40 days or more (see Figure 1 for R0
= 1.5). In all other scenarios, the combination of antivir-
als and school closure is substantially more effective
than either strategy alone. For highly transmissible epi-
demics (R0 = 2.5), fixed period school closure alone will
be ineffective (i.e. have a limited ~4% reduction in the
attack rate) (see Figure 1 for R0 = 2.5); therefore, addi-
tional rigorous social distancing based interventions
would need to be applied [21,23]. If the virus strain is
matched to stockpiled vaccines then vaccination strate-
gies suggested in [25] should be applied at an early
stage.
Selecting a school closure activation trigger for short
closure periods using a reported number of diagnosed
cases per day (rather than a fixed period of time, say 2
weeks) means that the timing adapts to faster develop-
ing epidemics (those with higher reproduction num-
bers). For example, the 40 daily diagnosed cases per
30,000 populations occur at 33, 20 and 15 days for R0 =
1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 respectively (see Table 1). These results
show that the optimal use of school closure depends
both on pandemic severity (which will determine the
feasible duration of school closure) and its transmissibil-
ity characteristics.
Our approach to modelling a generic influenza pan-
demic was to base epidemic characteristic on those of
seasonal influenza strains (for which data is available),
but to increase the overall transmissibility (by increasing
the basic transmission probability) in order to represent
higher infectivity of immunologically novel strains. We
thus assumed that the age specificity of infection fol-
lowed a pattern typical of seasonal influenza. With the
advent of the 2009/2010 pandemic, data from an actual
pandemic influenza strain has become available, albeit a
strain that has turned out to be less pathogenic and
immunologically novel than first thought. Our R0 =1 . 5
simulations align with estimates for the 2009 pandemic
[44,42,45-47], as does our derived serial interval of 2.49
days. The A/H1N1 2009 pandemic exhibited a some-
what different pattern of age-specific infectivity than our
seasonal influenza baseline, with higher attack rates in
Table 4 School closure policy recommendations
Pandemic transmissibility
Pandemic
severity
School
closure
duration
low (R0 = 1.5) medium (R0 = 2.0) high (R0 = 2.5)
mild 2 weeks Schools should be closed individually when cases are identified in each school; this policy should delayed until the first day
on which 13 new cases per 10,000 population are diagnosed (assuming 50% diagnosis of symptomatic individuals).
moderate 4 weeks Schools should be closed individually when cases are identified in each school; this policy should be instituted as soon as
possible once the pandemic has reached the community. Antivirals should be dispensed to slow the spread.
severe 8 weeks Schools should be closed individually
when cases are identified in each school;
this policy should delayed until the first
day on which 6 new cases per 10,000
populationare diagnosed (assuming
50% diagnosis rate). However, if the
activation trigger is missed all schools
should close as soon as possible.
Antivirals should be dispensed together
with school closure and home isolation.
All schools should close simultaneously
as soon as possible once the pandemic
reaches the community. Antivirals and
other non-pharmaceutical interventions
should also be applied.
All schools should close simultaneously
as soon as possible once the pandemic
reaches the community Antivirals
should be dispensed in larger extent to
slow down disease spread. Other social
distancing based interventions should
be rigorously applied.
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older adults. We conducted an alternate set of simula-
tions based on the A/H1N1 2009 age-specific attack rate
pattern and R0 (results not reported here). We found
that the alternative assumptions lead to a lower overall
attack rate (compared to a “seasonal” epidemic with the
same R0), but that the proportional effectiveness of
school closure and optimal activation triggers were
essentially identical.
Conclusions
Our simulation results give guidance as to public health
policy decisions in the refinement of school closure stra-
tegies to be used in a future influenza pandemic. We
have systematically evaluated school closure operational
issues to determine when schools should be closed and
re-opened to achieve the maximum reduction in influ-
enza spread. We found that the optimal timing of school
closure depends both on the duration of school closure
(which we assume will depend on the severity of the
influenza strain, with strains that are more severe in
terms of serious infection outcomes making longer peri-
ods of school closure acceptable) and on the transmissi-
bility of the influenza strain (which influences the rate
of growth and spread of the epidemic). Accurate early
estimates of epidemic characteristics such as the basic
reproduction number and disease severity are thus
necessary to achieve the maximum case reduction from
school closure. We found that a policy of allowing
schools to close individual l yw a sm u c hl e s ss e n s i t i v et o
the precise timing of the intervention than a policy of
simultaneous community-wide school closure, a valuable
observation given the difficulty in determining the true
degree of epidemic spread in the early stages of an
outbreak.
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